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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in medical technology offer childless
couples alternatives to traditional coital reproduction or adoption.
Unlike surrogacy or adoption, a new technique, the process of in-vitro
fertilization ("IVF"),' allows a couple to have a complete genetic rela-
tionship with their offspring. The IVF procedure allows the four- or
eight-celled product of IVF2 to be implanted immediately. Since IVF
1. In-vitro fertilization is the procedure whereby a female oocyte is fertilized with a male
sperm cell in a laboratory dish (hence "in vitro"-in glass). To commence the process, the
woman undergoes hormonal treatment to stimulate her ovaries to produce multiple oocytes or
ova. These ova are aspirated from the ovaries during an operation involving a laparoscopy. In
order to be fertilized, the ova are then combined with sperm cells. This fertilized oocyte is
allowed to grow to the four- or eight-cell stage, at which point the cells are introduced into the
uterus of a woman for implantation. Ethics Committee, American Fertility Society, Ethical
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Sept. 1986, at
32s (Supp. 1).
2. The most technically accurate name for the four- or eight-celled structures is "pre-
embryo." A conceptus becomes an embryo at the moment of implantation. Davis v. Davis, 15
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, 2099 n.ll (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992). However, there is
no consensus on how to refer to the structure.
IVF physicians and patients prefer to call it an embryo. This term humanizes the
agglomeration of cells and helps the patients identify with them. Andrea L. Bonnicksen,
Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the Clinical Setting, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Dec. 1988, at
26, 29.
To clients, the embryo symbolizes hope and potential parenthood. It affirms the
wife's femininity, the husband's masculinity, and the couple's potency. It is a
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frequently yields more pre-embryos than needed for a single implanta-
tion, extra pre-embryos may also be cryogenically frozen and
stored3-thus the pre-embryos' popular name, "frozen embryos." As
a result of the potential delay between fertilization and implantation,
however, frozen embryos are becoming the focus of legal debate.
The lapse between fertilization and implantation, facilitated by
the freezing of the pre-embryos, allows biological donors to change
their position about whether, when, and in whom implantation should
take place. In fact, prior to the implantation of the pre-embryo, 4 the
donors may have decided not to continue together as a couple.5 These
changes of position have led to controversy and litigation, focusing on
the status of the pre-embryo and the rights of the men and women
who participated in IVF,6 only to later disagree about the future of
powerful symbol with which clients establish emotional connection. . . . To
physicians and scientists, the embryo is a collection of cells with distinct
properties relating to its stage of development.
Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
This Comment will use the term pre-embryo, but will defer to the terminology used in the
cases during their discussion. In some cases, the terminology employed by the court demon-
strates the position it has taken with respect to the pre-embryos. In these instances the term
used by the court will be set-off by quotation marks.
3. Increasingly, reproductive health centers are giving patients the option of
cryogenically freezing and storing the pre-embryos created through the IVF process, in order
to thaw them later for implantation. Bonnicksen, supra note 2, at 29. For a complete
discussion of cryogenic preservation of human pre-embryos, see Alan Trounson, Preservation
of Human Eggs and Embryos, FERTILITY & STERILITY, July 1986, at 1. Prior to the
introduction of cryopreservation techniques, pre-embryos that were not implanted would have
been discarded, because a maximum of three pre-embryos are placed in the uterus at one time
in order to diminish the possibility of multiple pregnancies. John A. Robertson, Decisional
Authority over Embryo and Control of IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 285, 287 (1988);
Trounson, supra, at 4.
4. This Comment is distinguishable from articles that focus on the rights of the pre-
embryos as separate entities. See, e.g., Patricia A. Lagod & Martin L. Lagod, The Human
Preembryos, the Progenitors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, &
Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257 (1990); Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos:
Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1098 (1986). Other articles
more particularly examine the rights of the biological donors as affected by the pre-embryo.
E.g., Note, Reproductive Techniques and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 669 (1985).
This Comment does not advocate any particular disposition of the pre-embryos, and only
introduces the rights of these entities. It instead explores the rights of the two genetic donors
as to each other, when they are disputing the fate of the pre-embryo. To use Professor
Robertson's categorization of approaches to pre-embryo conflicts, it examines the "array of
reproductive and family interests that early embryos may serve." John A. Robertson, In the
Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 453 (1990).
5. Following the scenario raised by the Davis case, the analysis offered here will assume
the parties have decided to seek a divorce. See Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2205. It is also
potentially useful in resolving problems between couples who have never been married and
have decided to separate before implantation of the pre-embryo.
6. It is irrelevant for purposes of the analysis whether or not the parties are married. The
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the resulting pre-embryo.7
This Comment examines the respective rights of the biological
donors, and analyzes the legal issues this debate raises. In addressing
these issues, the Comment explores the two approaches adopted by
courts adjudicating these disputes: first, that the pre-embryo is life
entitled to state protection, and that implantation promotes its best
interest;" and second, that the pre-embryo is subject to the property
interests of its genetic donors, who alone should determine its disposi-
tion.9 However, both approaches burden the rights of the more vul-
nerable party in this situation, namely the donor who has relied on
the IVF procedure and wishes to implant the pre-embryo. This vul-
nerability arises because the courts' findings--determining joint inter-
est and requiring mutual consent for the disposition of the pre-
embryo-and the pre-embryo's limited viability often advantage the
non-consenting party in negotiations with the party wishing to
implant. Indeed, the non-consenting party's veto power makes the
other party susceptible to coercion concerning other aspects of the
dissolution proceeding. Consequently, this Comment proposes that
courts apply a contract theory that avoids the inequitable results of
applying either the pre-embryo-as-life or the pure property analysis
approaches. l
Part II provides a brief background of the IVF procedures and
the legal debate surrounding pre-embryos. Part III analyses and criti-
ques existing opinions regarding pre-embryos in light of general legal
doctrines. These opinions fail to grant appropriate redress to the
party who wants to proceed with implantation. Part IV explores the
gender-bias effects of the decisions. Finally, Part V proposes a
detailed contractual framework, and explains how this framework
may resolve disputes in the different possible scenarios that arise in
pre-embryo litigation, while considering the needs of the vulnerable
litigant.
crucial factor is that the parties at one point resolved and agreed to create a pre-embryo
together. This serves to distinguish cases where one or both of the two gametes joined in the
pre-embryo were donated anonymously.
7. In Davis, a divorce action, the wife argued that she should be allowed to implant the
pre-embryos. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, 2104 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989),
rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June
6, 1992); see also Mark Curriden, Frozen Embryos: The New Frontier, ABA J., Aug. 1989, at
68. The husband asserted that the pre-embryos should not be implanted. Davis, 15 Faro. L.
Rep. (BNA) at 2104; see also Curriden, supra, at 68; infra notes 38-40, 48-50 and
accompanying text.
8. See Davis, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2097; see also infra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text.
9. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); see also Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2205.
10. See discussion infra notes 69-71.
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II. THE PRE-EMBRYO
A pre-embryo is created through a complex procedure in which
the biological parents of the pre-embryo donate female and male
gametes, the ova and sperm, which are subsequently joined.II Sperm
are usually harvested from males through ejaculation. If the sperm is
deficient, hormonal techniques can be used to enhance sperm produc-
tion.' 2 The process for harvesting ova is more involved. To enhance
ova production, the woman first undergoes hormonal stimulation of
the ovaries.13 Then, the ova are harvested through a surgical proce-
dure.14 Finally, the sperm and ova are combined to produce a pre-
embryo.
This product is then allowed to grow to the four- or eight-cell
stage, at which time it is inserted into the woman's body." Several
pre-embryos are inserted at one time to increase the chances of suc-
cessful implantation. However, to reduce the risk of multiple
pregnancies, no more than three pre-embryos are usually implanted.16
The remaining pre-embryos are frozen, either to be implanted at a
later date, if necessary, or to be discarded. If the pre-embryos do not
successfully implant, the procedure is repeated. Under the current
state of technology, approximately 50% of the cases achieve success.17
Although this Comment deals only tangentially with the inter-
ests of the pre-embryo, I8 the legal status of the pre-embyos is nonethe-
11. See supra note I and accompanying text.
12. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 60.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15. The pre-embryos are inserted either into the uterus, which has been hormonally
stimulated to receive the pre-embryos, or into the fallopian tubes. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note
12, at 58.
16. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 287.
17. Trounson, supra note 3, at 6; Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 12, at 56, 63.
18. Discussions involving pre-embryos spark consideration of whether the pre-embryo is
life, and if so, its legal status. Answers to these questions may have vast ramifications on the
treatment of genetic donors. Legally and scientifically, it is beyond our ability to determine
when life begins. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1972). This Comment does not propose
to solve that question. However, it touches upon some of the arguments both for and against
declaring the pre-embryo legally cognizable life in dealing with the attendant ramifications the
determination will have on the genetic donors' rights.
Pre-embryos provoke deep emotional responses in persons, the same way the abortion
issue does. Bonnicksen, supra note 2, at 29; see also James Glieck, The Vatican on Birth
Science; Reproductive Help: Widespread and Unregulated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1987, at A16
(discussing the controversy surrounding IVF and new reproductive technologies, and the
Catholic Church's pro-life position, which has lead to its opposition of IVF). This is due in
part to the parties' emotional investment in the pre-embryos. Bonnicksen, supra note 2, at 27.
The words that people use to describe the pre-embryos often reveal the values they hold about
the pre-embryo's personhood. A scientist may call the pre-embryo a cell mass. Id. at 29. An
IVF parent may refer to it as an embryo or even a baby. Id. The latter term is less
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less relevant. Should the courts find that the pre-embryo has legally
cognizable life, then the legislatures and courts will have to determine
the extent to which the pre-embryo is entitled to legal protection.' 9 If,
on the other hand, the courts determine that promoting implantation
is paramount for the pre-embryo's best interests, then the donors'
wishes become irrelevant. However, under the current state of the
law, such a result would pose a practical problem, because the woman
who donated biological material to the pre-embryo cannot be forced
to undergo implantation. Such an imposition violates her right to pri-
vacy, bodily integrity, and procreative freedom.2 ° It would also raise
equal protection concerns, because such a decision would dispropor-
tionately affect female gamete donors. This problem would diminish,
although not disappear, if instead the state required that any pre-
embryo not desired by its biological donors be made available for
implantation in other willing persons. Such forced donations of one's
reproductive capacity may still impermissibly intrude upon the pri-
vacy rights of the biological donors.2'
In many cases, however, recognition of the state's interest in the
potential life of the pre-embryo is consistent with contract analysis.
The main goal of the contract framework is to permit implantation
whenever desired by either donor. The framework thus promotes the
life potential of the pre-embryo with a minimum burden upon the
rights of the genetic contributors.2 2 If the pre-embryo is not declared
scientifically accurate but denotes the emotional stake the patients have in the success and
survival of the pre-embryo. Id.
19. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statutory scheme requiring, among other
things, the determination of the viability of embryos before an abortion is performed, on the
grounds that a state has an interest in the embryo once it reaches viability.
20. Privacy interests are founded on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The privacy interest is a liberty interest. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1972). However, the right to privacy is not absolute. For instance, interests in
equality can outweigh the right to privacy. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 886-88 (1987) (interest in privacy, such as in enjoyment of private
property, must yield when it conflicts with equality or causes discrimination).
21. For purposes of simplifying the analysis of the relationship between the biological
donors, this Comment generally argues that the pre-embryo has no independent right to life,
and that the state, acting on behalf of the pre-embryo, cannot outweigh the choice of the
biological donors. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
22. At most, under the contract framework, the parties would have to determine whether
to implant the pre-embryo in the physiological mother or a surrogate. This promotes the pre-
embryo's interest-being implanted. There would be no forced implantation, but even the act
of allowing the pre-embryo to be implanted in a stranger promotes the pre-embryo's potential
life interest. If the decision to reproduce is made at IVF, then under the framework proposed
here, to allow the pre-embryo to be implanted merely carries out this previous decision, even if
it contravenes a unilateral recent one.
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to be legally cognizable life,23 however, then it will not be afforded
constitutional rights or protections, and these considerations will not
color the resolution of any dispute regarding its future.24
III. PRE-EMBRYO LITIGATION
Few cases in the United States have addressed the pre-embryos
issue.25 In Davis v. Davis,2 6 a trial court determined that pre-embryos
have "life" and therefore are entitled to state protection. 27 However,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed this determination.28 In
doing so, it rejected the argument that pre-embryos are entitled to
state protection, 29 and instead applied a property analysis, holding
that the biological donors had joint control over them.30 The Tennes-
see Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. It deter-
mined that the genetic donors had decisionmaking authority over the
pre-embryos, and that control over the disposition of the pre-embryos
was subject to a judicial balancing of the right to procreate and the
right not to procreate.3'
Another case, York v. Jones,3 2 used a similar proprietary
approach. York involved a dispute between biological donors and the
fertility clinic where their pre-embryo was stored. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia declared that the
23. Generally, the question of whether the pre-embryo is life or not has been considered
beyond the scope of the courts. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
24. See id. (noting that the right of the state to intervene past the first trimester of
pregnancy is based on "important and legitimate interests in the health of the mother," not on
a determination of whether fetus is life; the pre-embryo, the precursor of fetus in development,
also falls outside the state's interest).
25. To date, there have been five opinions in the United States dealing with pre-embryos:
the three Davis opinions (Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574
(Tenn. June 6, 1992)); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), and Del Zio v.
Columbia Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1978) (unpublished
opinion).
26. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2097.
27. Id. at 2103 ("The Court finds and concludes that by whatever name one chooses to call
the seven frozen entities-be it pre-embryo or embryo-those entities are human beings; they
are not property.").
28. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2206.
29. Id.
30. Id. The court stated:
On the facts of this case, it would be repugnant and offensive to constitutional
principles to order Mary Sue to implant these fertilized ova against her will. It
would be equally repugnant to order Junior to bear the psychological, if not the
legal consequences of paternity against his will. Jointly, the parties share an
interest in the seven fertilized ova.
31. Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574, at *10 (Tenn. June 1, 1992).
32. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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biological donors had contractual property interests in' the pre-
embryo, relying on language in an agreement the donors had entered
into with the IVF center.3 Thus, as demonstrated by these cases,
several different approaches and results are employed in pre-embryo
litigation. Because of this analytical diversity, it is helpful to examine
these cases more fully, and explore the repercussions of their holdings
on the procreative rights of men and women.
A. Overview of the Davis v. Davis Litigation
Mary Sue and Junior Davis were married for nine years, during
which they made several fruitless attempts to have a child. After nat-
ural conception proved impossible, the Davises attempted IVF six
times, with no success.34 The Davises then tried adoption without
success.35 Subsequently, they decide to re-attempt the IVF method.
This time, they used the pre-embryo cryopreservation option;36 seven
of the pre-embryos from their last IVF attempt had been frozen and
were eligible for this medical procedure.3"
Shortly thereafter, Junior Davis filed for divorce. The future of
the pre-embryos became a central issue in the divorce case. 38 At trial,
Mary Sue Davis argued that the pre-embryos were life, that they rep-
resented her best opportunity to bear a child, and that she should be
allowed to implant them.39 Junior Davis denied that the embryos
were cognizable as "life," '  and claimed they were joint property.
Junior further argued that his reproductive rights would be violated if
the court forced unwanted fatherhood upon him.41
In deciding this difficult case, the trial court formulated the issue
33. Id. at 425.
34. Davis, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2098. Because of five previous tubal pregnancies,
Mary Sue was forced to undertake surgical treatment "which rendered her incapable of
natural conception." Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. Cryoperservation is a process whereby the pre-embryo is frozen in liquid
nitrogen. See Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at 1083; see also Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at
2098 n.3.
37. Id. Nine ova were orginally fertilized, producing acceptable zygotes. Two of the
zygotes were unsuccessfully implanted in Mrs. Davis, leaving seven pre-embryos for possible
future use. Id.
38. See Davis v. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205, 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
39. Divorce Case Raises a New Issue: Status of Fertilized Eggs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1989,
at Al; see also Curriden, supra note 7, at 68.
40. Curriden, supra note 7, at 68.
41. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) app. B at 2108. Junior Davis asserted that if the choice
was whether Mary Sue Davis or an anonymous donor should implant the pre-embryos, he
preferred Mary Sue to implant them. If a child did result from the implantations, he would
attempt to establish a parent-child bond with it and would seek to support and obtain custody
of the child. Id.
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as whether the Davises had already produced a "human being to be
known as their child."' 42 The court answered this question affirma-
tively, holding that the "seven frozen entities" were human beings,
that life begins at the moment of conception, and that, therefore, the
Davises had accomplished their goal of creating human life. 43 Apply-
ing the doctrine of parens patriae,4" the court found that the state had
an interest in the protection of the "life" contained in the preserved
pre-embryos.45 In order to promote the pre-embryos' interests, the
court then awarded Mary Sue Davis temporary custody so that she
could implant, and reserved jurisdiction on the issues of support, visi-
tation, and permanent custody, pending live birth of the pre-
embryos.46
B. Pre-Embryo as Life
In Davis, the trial court declared that pre-embryos were life.47
At the trial, the Davises differed sharply over how the pre-embryos
should be treated: Mary Sue Davis wanted to implant the pre-
embryos, while Junior Davis wanted them to be declared property
subject to joint control, and sought the authority to prevent implanta-
tion.48 However, by the time the case went to appeal, Mary Sue
Davis' situation had changed. She no longer wished to implant the
pre-embryos; she wanted to donate them to a childless couple. At
that time, Junior Davis still sought the authority to block any implan-
tation attempt.49 Then, after the Tennessee Court of Appeals ren-
dered its decision, Junior Davis shifted his position as well. Because
his present wife apparently could not have children, he now wished to
have the pre-embryos implanted in a surrogate to provide a child for
his new marriage.50 At this point, despite all this litigation, the pre-
42. Id. at 2103 (emphasis added). Even at this early stage of its opinion, the circuit court
characterized the pre-zygotes as human beings.
43. Id. In its amicus brief, the ACLU argued on appeal that this finding was totally
inapposite to the holdings in Roe and its progeny. Amicus Brief of American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Tenn. at 4, Davis (No. E-14496).
44. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2103. Parens patriae refers to the traditional role of
the state as a legal guardian of persons under legal disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990).
45. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2103-04.
46. Id. at 2104.
47. Id. at 2103.
48. Id. app. B at 2108. The court's summary of Junior Davis' testimony at trial indicates
that he did not "want exclusive control over the embryos, he insisted that he and Mrs. Davis
should jointly decide about their disposition." Id.; see also supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
49. See Mark Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, ABA J., Dec. 1990, at 36.
50. Id. By the time litigation had reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, Junior Davis no
[Vol. 46:803
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embryo's fate was still undecided.5"
In achieving its result, the Davis trial court ignored the rights and
interests of the parties before it, instead focusing on whether the pre-
embryos were human life. In so doing, it placed the pre-embryos'
interests first. Declaring that even at the four-cell stage the pre-
embryo is "human," and "life," the court held that pre-embryos are
human beings, fully differentiated and indistinguishable from
embryos.-2 Thus, the court concluded the pre-embryos were not
property.
Following this determination, the court applied the parens
patriae doctrine, 53 equating that doctrine with the "best interest of the
child" doctrine.-4 Because the viability of the pre-embryos is two
years, and longer preservation would be "tantamount to the destruc-
tion of these human beings,"55 the trial court concluded that the state
can act to protect their best interest and allow Mrs. Davis to implant.
In reaching this holding, the court barely considered the argu-
ments for and against a determination that pre-embryos are life. The
court ignored the fact that pre-embryos are at a much earlier stage of
development than fetuses, which are subject to abortions. In addition,
the court overlooked several contraceptive methods which prevent the
implantation of fertilized ova more developed than the pre-embryo.
5 6
The court thus ignored the anomaly created by its decision: pre-
embryos, protected as wards of the state in this early stage, have no
such protection later in development.
Neither did the court address its determination's ramifications
for the procreative rights of men and women. The court relied on
some factual evidence and recent advances in genetic technology to
longer wanted anyone to implant the pre-embryos, readopting his posture in the trial court.
See Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574, at *1.
51. By this time, ironically, it is possible that the Davises' pre-embryos have exceeded their
storage life. They have been in storage since 1988, before the initiation of the divorce action.
Pre-embryos have not been proven to have any viability beyond two years of cryopreservation.
Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2104.
52. The term "differentiation" means either that the cells are different from the cells of its
parents or that the cells are changing to assume their ultimate function to become an organ.
Id. at 2101. The court uses the former definition to support its assertion that the cells are
highly differentiated, a pivotal assertion in declaring the cells independent life. Id. at 2102.
53. See Curriden, supra note 49, at 34; see also supra note 44.
54. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2104.
55. Id.
56. The intra-uterine device and the "morning after" pill, a birth-control pill designed to
void the conceptus in the woman's body, are examples of contraceptive methods designed to
prevent pregnancy by thwarting the implantation of the fertilized ova in the uterus. MERCK,
SHARP & DOHME RESEARCH LAB., MERCK & CO. INC., THE MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1737 (15th ed. 1987).
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support its findings, but failed to distinguish contrary but equally con-
vincing evidence." Both sides presented testimony about whether the
pre-embryos were life. One expert proposed that the pre-embryos
were alive because they contained the requisite and distinct chromo-
somes that comprise a genetically distinct human life.5 8 Three other
experts testified that the pre-embryos represented the potential for
life, but were not sufficiently developed to be human life. However,
the court declined to adopt the latter view, reasoning that because the
experts' notes frequently referred to the cells as embryos, the pre-
embryo label was invalid.59 The court also rejected the argument that
pre-embryos, because of the possibility that they will never success-
fully implant or survive, have an even weaker claim on being labeled
life than embryos.60
The court also refused to apply Roe v. Wade,6' contending that
Roe only applied to abortion cases. 62 This superficial distinction is
unconvincing. The court reached such a conclusion without explain-
ing how the pre-embryos differ from the embryos and fetuses the
Supreme Court considered in Roe. The Davis court failed to recog-
nize that its determination that the pre-embryos are human directly
conflicted with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Roe that dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy the state does not have a right to
decide when life begins and may conflict with a woman's reproductive
freedom. In fact, in Roe, the Supreme Court itself declined to deter-
mine when life begins, 63 and instead determined that a woman's right
of bodily integrity is superior to the state's rights in protecting the
embryo in the first trimester of pregnancy.61
Because of its determination that the pre-embryos are human
beings, entitled to state parens patriae protection, a significant ramifi-
cation of Davis is that it establishes the pre-embryos as entities with
legally cognizable rights. These rights will necessarily compete and
57. In appendix B of the opinion, the court summarizes all of the testimony offered at trial.
Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) app. B at 2107-12.
58. See id. at 2111-12 (testimony of Dr. Lejeune).
59. Id. at 2121-22.
60. Experts at the trial testified that, unlike embryos, which are cell-masses implanted in
the uterine wall, pre-embryos are not implanted, may never successfully implant, and may not
even survive once they do implant. Therefore, the experts concluded, pre-embryos had less of
a claim to the title "live" than embryos. The trial court rejected this position. Id. at 2101.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1972). Roe v. Wade is the United States Supreme Court's landmark
abortion decision in which the Court held that a woman has the right to seek an abortion in
the first trimester of pregnancy. See id. at 163.
62. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) at 2103.
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
64. Although the Davis trial court bestowed state protection on the pre-embryo, under
Roe, the court could not prevent the pre-embryo's distruction in a subsequent abortion.
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detract from the rights of the biological donors implied from Roe.6 5
This is already demonstrated in Davis. Junior Davis argued that he
had a right not to reproduce.66 The court never addressed this argu-
ment, which implies that Junior's procreative rights were irrelevant to
its determination. As the case was resolved in the trial court, Mary
Sue appears victorious because she received custody of the pre-
embryos, as she desired. However, a decision based on the rationale
that pre-embryos have a right to life is at least equally dangerous to
the procreative rights of women. Should Mary Sue change her mind
about implanting the pre-embryos, there would still be a precedent
holding that the pre-embryos are life. As their biological mother, she
may be held to have a duty to implant. However, as long as Roe
remains good law, presumably a court could not actively order Mary
Sue Davis to implant, which creates an inherent paradox in the
court's decision. Furthermore, the court might mandate adoption in
the best interest of the child, even where both donors agree that they
do not want the pre-embryos implanted, effectively ignoring the rights
of both parties to decide whether to procreate once a frozen pre-
embryo exists.67
C. Pre-Embryo as Property
1. THE DAVIS APPEAL
The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court deci-
sion. 68 The appellate court's opinion had two principle aspects: first,
it rejected the trial court's pre-embryo-as-life approach; and second, it
adopted a property analysis.6 9 The court demonstrated its reformula-
tion of the analysis by its rephrasing of the issue as "who is entitled to
control seven of Mary Sue's ova fertilized by Junior's sperm through
65. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
66. Davis, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) app. B at 2108.
67. If the duty to the pre-embryos is extended to parallel the duty to one's children, the
Davis court's determination could lead to a virtual "parade of horribles." Does the court's
determination create in Mary Sue an obligation to implant some pre-embryos, or all seven? If
the first or second implantations are successful, will Mary Sue be forced to implant the
remaining pre-embryos because it is in their best interest? Will the court order adoption of the
remaining pre-embryos?
68. Davis v. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205, 2206 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) aff'd, No. 34, 1992
WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992).
69. Id. The court of appeals did not openly embrace a property methodology. However, it
phrased its decision as an award of "joint control" over the pre-embryos, and determined that
the parties "share an interest" in the pre-embryos. Id. at 2206. These terms are borrowed
from property law. For an example of this type of property analogy, see York v. Jones, 717 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), discussed in Part III.C.2. Cf. Curriden, supra note 49 (discussing
the "joint custody" approach).
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the in-vitro fertilization process."" The court answered this question
by holding that "the parties share an interest in the seven fertilized
ova" and awarding the parties joint control.7
The Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's conclu-
sions as contrary to existing constitutional law.72 Discrediting the
trial court's creation of state interests in pre-embryos, the court of
appeals catalogued the caselaw and statutes that addressed causes of
action for "persons," emphasizing the absence of any pre-born entity
on the list.7 3 The court concluded that the pre-embryos, as yet
unborn, are not entitled to state protection.74 However, the court's
property analysis, combined with its attempt to balance the parties'
rights, is even less capable of safeguarding the interests of the party
wanting to implant than the paternalistic approach adopted by the
circuit court.75
The Tennessee Court of Appeals based its determination that the
pre-embryos are not entitled to state protection on two principles:
first, there is no precedent for extending the protection of the state to
the pre-embryos;76 and second, mandating implantation would con-
travene the constitutional procreative rights of the two biological
donors.77 In essence, the court of appeals reasoned that the trial
court, by holding that the pre-embryos are life, was unjustifiably
"order[ing] Junior to bear the psychological, if not the legal, conse-
quences of paternity against his will."
78
However, the conclusion of the Tennessee Court of Appeals
about the fundamental rights involved is inaccurate and overbroad.
The court found that "it would be repugnant and offensive to consti-
tutional principles to order Mary Sue to implant these fertilized ova
against her will. It would be equally repugnant to order Junior to
bear the psychological if not the legal consequences of paternity
against his will." 79 The appellate court thus equated Junior's procrea-
tive freedom with Mary Sue's right not to be forced to implant. In
doing so, the court failed to recognize that the right to resist implana-
70. Id. at 2205 (emphasis added).
71. Id. The court of appeals cited York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. at 421, for the proposition
that the parties have an interest in the pre-embryos.
72. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2206.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Cf Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1986, at 10
(applying property concepts to the analysis of the use of body parts).






tion involves two distinct interests: procreational freedom,8" and bod-
ily integrity. Junior's claim involved only the former. Furthermore,
certain cases may also implicate a woman's constitutional right to
procreate. If such a right exists, then the court's analysis does not
promote equality among the hypothetical holders of these rights.
The decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Davis also
neglects the dual nature of the rights stemming from Roe, and mistak-
enly equalizes the concept of forced fatherhood with forced preg-
nancy.8 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,82 the United States
Supreme Court established that a married woman's decision to have
an abortion prevails over any desire the man may have regarding the
matter. Similarly, a husband cannot force his wife to undergo an
unwanted abortion.8 3  Planned Parenthood thus implies that the
woman's dual choices outweigh the man's single, procreative interest.
In a situation such as the one presented by Davis, the true rights
that the court must balance are the parties' countervailing procreative
rights.8 4 The Tennessee Court of Appeals' opinion in Davis rests par-
tially on the assumption that permitting Mary Sue to implant would
violate Junior's procreative rights. 85 It fails to recognize that allowing
him to prevent her from implanting would infringe Mary Sue's pro-
creative rights.8 6 Instead, the court assumed Mary Sue's procreative
rights would not have been affected. However, by Mary Sue's own
assertion, she was not giving up her procreative rights; she wanted the
pre-embryos turned over to a third party for implantation.87 This is
still an attempt, albeit an attenuated one, to exercise a right to procre-
ate. 8 Furthermore, nothing in the rationale of the decision turns on
80. Procreational freedom, for purposes of this Comment, refers to a person's right to
procreate should he or she so choose, unimpaired by the partner's decision or influence.
81. For examples of this dual nature of rights, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(invalidating regulations which restrict availability of contraceptives to unmarried couples);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state cannot criminalize use of contraceptives
by married couple).
82. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
83. Id.
84. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidation of state ban on
commercial distribution of non-prescription contraceptives); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438.
85. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 380-81 (1985); Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at 1097 (asserting that
the right to abortion is a function of the right to bodily autonomy, not the right to destroy a
pre-embryo which is not attached to the body); Ronald Smothers, Embryos in a Divorce Case.
Joint Property or Offspring?, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1989, at 1 (reporting that Mr. Davis did
not desire compelled fatherhood; Mrs. Davis struggled for her last chance at motherhood).
87. See Divorce Case Raises a New Issue: Status of Fertilized Eggs, supra note 39, at A11.
88. "While a party may vindicate his own constitutional rights, he may not seek
vindication for the rights of others." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
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the change in Mary Sue's litigious posture. Arguably, this decision
would apply even if Mary Sue still wanted to implant the pre-embryos
herself. Thus, by merely considering Junior Davis' procreative rights,
Davis did not balance both parties' procreative rights, did not achieve
a balance of their constitutional rights, and did not reach an equitable
solution.
Davis' second flaw is in its treatment of the pre-embryos purely
as property. It is difficult to determine whether the opinion reaches
its determination under a constitutional law approach, or whether it
applies a property law analysis that happens to address constitutional
law concerns. The court of appeals similarly declared that Mary Sue
and Junior "share an interest" in the pre-embryos, using property law
terminology.8 9 However, the court merely asserted a property law
analogy without explaining why it is appropriate.
By awarding joint control over the pre-embryos, Davis guaran-
teed a stalemate any time either spouse alone wants to make a deci-
sion or exercise dominion over the pre-embryo. As a result, the
award of joint control inherently places the party who wants to
implant at a disadvantage, 90 since he or she must persuade or bribe
the other donor to consent. This advantage for the donor opposing
implantation increases due to the "biological timeclock"-the limited
viability of the pre-embryos. 9'
Furthermore, by granting joint "control," the Tennessee Court
of Appeals seemed to treat the pre-embryo under the principles of
joint custody, instead of the proprietary principles to which it claimed
to adhere. Upon divorce, the court usually divides joint property, and
each former spouse has full control over some share.92 Under this
analysis, the court of appeals apparently treated the pre-embryos as
children of a divorce instead of as property.93
dissenting) (citations omitted). Mary Sue cannot assert the right of others to procreate, even
by having pre-embryos donated to others.
89. Citing York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), for the property terminology,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals correctly redirected the focus from the pre-embryos to the
couple who donated the genetic material to create them. However, the court failed to consider
the contractual rights prong of the York opinion. Davis, 59 U.S.L.W. at 2205; see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text. York broke the deadlock between the parents and the IVF
center by basing its decision on the existing contract, which referred to the pre-embryos as
property. See infra part III.C.2.
90. See supra notes 70-7 1.
91. Pre-embryos have limited viability, estimated to end at around two years. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
92. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, 2103 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, 59
U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992).
93. Some writers confused or interpreted Davis's "joint control" holding as awarding joint
custody.. Curriden, supra note 49, at 36.
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The joint custody analogy is further misplaced because joint cus-
tody assumes that both parents are acting with the best interest of the
child in mind.94 However, by making the biological donors share
responsibilities about pre-embryo decisions, one donor effectively
bears the entire burden.95 In reality, such joint custody grants a veto
power to one parent over the other's child-rearing decisions.96 Several
legislatures have recognized this, and after first promulgating joint
custody, have receded from that position, and now award joint
custody after divorce only when the parental relationship is
conciliatory.97
Whatever the benefits of joint custody between fit parents, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals' decision in Davis produces all of the crit-
icized ill effects of joint custody with none of the benefits. It grants
one donor veto power, forcing the other donor to bribe the non-con-
senting party in order to do anything with the pre-embryo. This is
especially catastrophic when the donors have irreconcilable views that
the pre-embryo should not be used by the other, a stalemate which is
particularly tragic because of the pre-embryos' short-term viability. 9
In fact, the "joint control" determination virtually assures that the
pre-embryo will not be implanted. Thus, regardless of the court's
position as to the pre-embryo's personhood, the court's award not
only countervenes the policies behind joint custody, but also eviscer-
ates the state's interest, albeit attenuated in this case, in potential
life.99
Ironically, after the appeal, Junior Davis expressed a wish to
have the pre-embryos implanted. 'I Yet, this possibility may now be
foreclosed to him because of the court's focus on his right to prevent
procreation and its accompanying "joint control" solution. Mary Sue
94. Burton S. Blond, In the Child's Best Interests-A Better Way: The Case For
Presumptive Joint Custody in Missouri, 52 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 567, 568 (1984); Daniel R.
Mummerg, Whose Child is it Anyway? Awarding Joint Custody over the Objection of One
Parent, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 625, 631 (1987).
95. Mummerg, supra note 94, at 626.
96. Thus, if the parents cannot agree, neither parent can act for the child. Chamberlin,
Joint Custody: Its Legislative and Judicial Evolution, TRIAL, Apr. 1989, at 23, 26.
97. Id. at 24; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(d) (West Supp. 1989) (repealing statute
prefering joint custody).
98. See Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, app. Bat 2110 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989) ("[T]he longest human pre-embryos have been stored and remain viable has been for an
approximate two-year period."), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No.
34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. But
see Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at 1098 (maximum length of storage of pre-embryos is ten years,
for policy reasons).
99. See supra note 19.
100. See Curriden, supra note 49, at 36.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
may never agree to have Junior use the pre-embryos. Therefore, it
appears that the appellate court's decision in Davis is just as inequita-
ble as the circuit court's decision. In contrast, as will be demon-
strated below, a contract-oriented approach seeking to protect the
more vulnerable party will best achieve an equitable result, as well as
most closely conform to the intent of the parties, even where the par-
ties shift positions as kaleidoscopically as they did in the Davis
litigation.
2. YORK V JONES
The property analysis used by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in
Davis parallels that of York v. Jones,l0 1 which resolved a dispute
between biological donors and an IVF center. However, there is a
significant difference-the property concepts used by the court in
York were rooted in the IVF contract that was central to the dispute.
Steven and Riza York signed a cryopreservation agreement with
the Howard and Georgeanna Jones Institute for Reproductive
Medicine, 102 detailing the Institute's procedures, policies, and the
Yorks' rights.'0 3 Thereafter, the Yorks underwent IVF treatment,
and one pre-embryo was cryogenically preserved and stored by the
Institute. The Yorks then wished to transfer the pre-embryo to
another center, but the Institute refused. l04 The Yorks then sued the
Institute for, among other things, breach of contract."' 5 The Institute
filed a motion to dismiss the Yorks' complaint, arguing that the
101. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
102. Id. at 423.
103. Id. at 424. The Cryopreservation Agreement provides in pertinent part:
We may withdraw our consent and discontinue participation at any time without
prejudice and we understand our pre-zygotes will be stored only as long as we are
active IVF patients at The Howard and Georgeanna Jones Institute For
Reproductive Medicine or until the end of our normal reproductive years. We
have the principle responsibility to decide the disposition of our pre-zygotes. Our
frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for the purpose of
intrauterine transfer without the written consents of us both. In the event of
divorce, we understand legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be
determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to
attempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand we may choose one of three fates
for our pre-zygotes that remain in frozen storage. Our pre-zygotes may be:
1) donated to another infertile couple (who will remain unknown to us);
2) donated for approved research investigation; or 3) thawed but not allowed to
undergo further development.
Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 422.
105. The Yorks filed a complaint in four counts: breach of contract, quasi-contract,
detinue, and an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and
compensatory relief. Id. at 423.
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Yorks' options regarding the disposition of the pre-embryo were lim-
ited to those outlined in the agreement.106 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia denied the Institute's motion to dis-
miss.10 7 Focusing on the agreement's continuous reference to the pre-
embryo as the Yorks' property,1 08 the district court found that the
Yorks had a property interest in the frozen pre-embryo created from
their gametes. 109
The York opinion rests on findings that under the York Institute
agreement, the pre-embryos were the York's property, and that the
Yorks and the Institute had entered into a bailor-bailee relationship
regarding that property."' The Institute was in lawful possession of
the pre-embryo that had been entrusted to it, and it had the "duty to
account for the thing as the property of another.""'
The written agreement between the Yorks and the Institute facil-
itated the resolution of their dispute. The parties had sufficiently
structured their transaction in that document to guide the court." 2
Hence, a contract analysis was obviously appropriate. Indeed, the
property law terminology in the parties' own document promoted the
court's use of property analysis. 13 Unfortunately, however, courts
face a more difficult task in a situation, like that of the Davises, where
there is no written evidence of the parties' intent when they undertook
the IVF process. Donor solidarity also simplified the scenario in
York. Both spouses were pursuing the same end-they wished to pro-
create together. In contrast, the Davises were disputing the fate of
their reproductive product among themselves.
D. Pre-Embryos as Neither Persons nor Property
The most recent pronouncement on the rights and status of
donors is the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in Davis v. Davis."
14
After the Tennessee Court of Appeals granted the Davises joint cus-
106. Id. at 425. Further, the Institute argued that any property interest the York's had in
the pre-embryo was limited by the Virginia Human Research Statute. Id. The Institute
argued that because the Statute regulated all uses and procedures for and with pre-embryos,
the Yorks' request could not be entertained unless it fell within the Statute. Id.
107. Id. at 427, 429. The district court determined that the complaint contained a sufficient
allegation of a cause of action to withstand a motion to dismiss.
108. Id. at 425, 426; see also supra note 97.
109. York, 717 F. Supp. at 429.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Bonnicksen, supra note 2, at 28. Most centers require these agreements. Some
appear as consent forms, while others provide more practical data to the patient. Id.
113. York, 717 F. Supp. at 425.
114. No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 1, 1992).
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tody over the frozen pre-embryos, Mary Sue Davis appealed to the
state supreme court, challenging the decision's constitutionality." 5
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' result,
but on a different basis.1 16 Although the court's decision did not rest
on a contract analysis, the court did briefly review the analysis pro-
posed by the contract theory.
The court first acknowledged that the Davises have an owner-
ship-like interest in the pre-embryo, at least to the extent that they
have decisionmaking authority over it."' The court then asserted
that any determination about whether donors could enter into
enforceable IVF agreements required establishing the locus of the
donors' decisionmaking authority." As donors, the Davises retained
such authority over the pre-embryo because they donated the genetic
material of which the pre-embryo was composed.' 19 On this basis, the
court presumed that IVF agreements should be enforced as between
the donors. 1
20
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not decide the case
under contract theory because there was no initial agreement between
the Davises.121 Instead, it recharacterized the issue before it as
"whether the parties will become parents."'' 22 The court's constitu-
tional analysis began by an exploration of the right to privacy, both in
the United States Constitution 123 and the Tennessee Constitution.
124
The court emphasized that the original foundation for such a right
was the need to keep government from intruding into "intimate ques-
tions of personal and family concern."' 12  The court concluded that it
must balance two rights of procreational autonomy asserted by the
litigants: "the right to procreate and the right to avoid
115. Id. at *l.
116. Id. at *1, *16.
117. Id. at *9. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated as much, even after it admonished the
appellate court awarding joint custody of the pre-embryos and implying that the pre-embryos
are property. Id. at *7.
118. Id. The court did express its reluctance to address the enforcement of agreements,
asserting that it was not necessary to its result. Id.
119. Id. at *9.
120. Id. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that the donors also bear the
ability to modify, by subsequent written agreement, their initial written IVF agreement. Id.
121. Id. at *10. The court did acknowledge the argument that by undergoing IVF the
parties impliedly agreed to procreate. Id. The court rejected this theory because there was no
evidence in the record that, in entering into an implied agreement, the Davises considered and
planned for contingencies such as the one they were facing. Id.
122. Id.





Curiously, although the court began its analysis by acknowledg-
ing that women contribute more to the IVF process than men, it did
not weigh this consideration as a factor in the balancing test it pro-
posed. Instead, the court summarily concluded that the woman's
contribution must be seen as "entirely equivalent" to the man's
because the parties' contributions "must be viewed in light of the joys
of parenthood ... or the relative anguish of a lifetime of unwanted
parenthood."
127
The remainder of the opinion was comprised of a rather thin and
formalistic delineation of factors the court weighed in the balance.
The court stated that it was considering "the burdens imposed on the
parties by solutions that would have the effect of disallowing the exer-
cise of individual procreational autonomy with respect to these partic-
ular pre-embryos."' 28  However, the court began its balancing by
considering the effect that not procreating would have on the parties.
It slighted any "sweat equity" Mary Sue Davis had in the pre-
embryos, while it gave inordinate weight to Junior Davis' reluctance
to procreate due to his family history of being the child of divorced
parents. 29 This disparity is highlighted by the dicta that indicates
this burden on Junior Davis could be overcome by Mary Sue only if
she sought to implant the pre-embryos in herself and had no other
mean of achieving parenthood.13 0  The opinion seems to place a
thumb on the scale on the side of the party seeking to avoid procrea-
tion, described as the party who "obviously has the greater inter-
est."' 3'' The Tennessee Supreme Court's formula thus does not
account for relative vulnerability. In contrast to the solution pro-
posed by this Comment, which favors the party seeking implantation,
126. Id. at *14. The court, relying on Roe's trimester analysis, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), decided that the state has no interest in the pre-embryo. Davis, 1992 WL 115574,
at * 14. The court reasoned that if the state's interest does not commence until the embryo has
passed significant developmental stages, id. at *17 n.27, then it can have no interest in a pre-
embryo in an earlier stage of development.
127. Id. at * 14. This assertion flies in the face of concerns over equitable results. The court
offered no justification for summarily leveling a possible factor that would weigh heavily in the
woman's favor.
128. Id. at *15.
129. Id. at *16.
130. Id. The last criteria the court used to justify blocking Mary Sue's attempts was
disingenuous. The court acknowledged earlier in the opinion that Mary Sue could not
conceive, id. at *3, unless she again underwent the painful IVF process, id. at *16. This
seemed irrelevant to a court striving to save Junior Davis from possible future psychological
trauma.
131. Id. at *17.
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the Tennessee Supreme Court's solution frustrates implantation. 132
IV. GENDER-BIAS IMPLICATIONS
The courts' treatment of the parties' procreative rights in pre-
embryo litigation uses gender-neutral language. Like most superfi-
cially gender-neutral law, it has tacit gendered effects. As the Davis
litigation illustrates, the courts' rationales work a hardship upon the
party who wants to implant the pre-embryo. Because of the woman's
physical investment in IVF, she will probably be the one who wants to
proceed with implantation.
133
The property analogy and the courts' allocation of joint control
to the donors effectively ensures the right to veto implantation. It
ignores the parties' countervailing rights to procreate. Therefore, to
determine which of these conflicting rights are at stake in a pre-
embryo situation, we need to determine the constitutional status of
each. '
34
The United States Supreme Court has never defined procreative
rights.' 3' The Supreme Court cases that have addressed procreative
rights all involved the right not to procreate. Conceptually, however,
the right of procreative freedom is exercised when one makes a deci-
sion to bear a child, or to refrain from bearing a child. Such a right
seems rooted in the right to privacy.I36 It is only logical to assume
that the person who is seeking to implant the pre-embryo has the
affirmative right to procreate, which is equally affected by a court's
decision. To enforce one party's rights necessarily denies the other
party's rights in a situation where one party wants to procreate and
the other does not. This causes a conflict of the parties' equal per-
sonal liberty interests, and to enforce the interests of one would be to
deprive the other. 13 Instead, the court should seek to achieve equity
132. Id. In weighing the interests of the parties disputing the pre-embryos disposition, the
court stated that "[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than
the use of the preembryos in question." Id.
133. The woman has a greater physical investment in the pre-embryo because the process
that culminates in the harvesting of ova is far more physically arduous than the donation of
sperm. See supra note 1. Note, however, that her ability to carry the embryo to term is not a
consideration because she cannot be compelled to do so against her wishes. See discussion
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
134. For an exposition of procreative rights and their development by the courts, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10 (2d ed. 1988).
135. Note, supra note 4, at 674-75, 685 (indicating that no court has ruled on whether the
constitution defines procreative rights).
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (basing holding to invalidate state
criminalization of married couple's use of contraceptives on right to privacy).
137. Professor Fineman has proposed basing the outcome of similar conflicts on the relative
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between the parties. '38
The Tennessee Supreme Court's Davis opinion is an example of
gender-biased analysis. The court purported to resolve pre-embryo
disputes by balancing constitutional considerations of procreating and
not procreating. 3 9 However, the court unjustifiably discounted the
woman's "sweat equity" contribution to the pre-embryo. 1" Instead
of giving weight to Mary Sue Davis' tangible past performance, the
Tennessee Supreme Court focused on Junior Davis' possible psycho-
logical conflicts, which he foresaw based on his impressions of the
past. 4 ' It is a disservice to negate a woman's contribution because
only she can produce the ova for a pre-embryo, especially when her
tangible contribution is negated in favor of an intangible fear.
In the pre-embryo cases, the party who opposes implantation has
already freely given the necessary genetic material. The parties exer-
cised their right to procreate when they decided to undergo IVF pro-
cedures. No further action is required from the non-consenting party.
Thus, the non-consenting party's rights would not be impinged if the
court focuses on the point in time when the parties entered into the
IVF agreement. 142
However, the party opposing implantation is essentially asking to
be relieved of that earlier exercise of the right to procreate. At the
time they first contemplated IVF, both parties were in agreement.
Now they are not. The party opposing implantation argues that,
because of the serendipitous existence of a frozen pre-embryo in stor-
age, the first exercise of the right to procreate should not be taken into
account; rather, the court should uphold only their second, more
recent decision not to procreate. They are asking a court to enforce
that second decision by legally denying the other party access to the
pre-embryo.
Because the rights to procreate or not are equally balanced ini-
needs of the parties. Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and
Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789. Although Professor Fineman addresses financial need,
her method applies equally when weighing the parties' emotional and psychological needs.
138. See id.
139. Davis, 1992 WL 11574, at *14.
140. Id.
141. Junior Davis asserted that should the pre-embryo fabricated with his genetic material
be successfully implanted and delivered, he would be torn by paternal feeling towards the
child, and would be worried that the couple parenting the child would someday divorce. Id. at
16.
142. If the woman is the non-consenting party, the court would not force her to bear the
child. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Rather, the court would appoint a willing
surrogate for the pregnancy. Therefore, by focusing on the parties' consent at the time they
donated the biological material, a court order of implantation would not affect or infringe on
the bodily integrity rights of either of the parties.
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tially, the attempt to balance procreative rights does not help the
courts reach a determination in these cases. 143 However, because the
parties' rights do not remain balanced, the courts need not decide
constitutional rights by happenstance. Even though both parties'
have constitutional interests at stake, their claims at the time of dis-
pute are not and should not be considered equal. While the man and
the woman both possess the right to procreate or not procreate, when
these rights in the woman are added to her right of bodily integrity,
together they outweigh the man's right not to procreate. Thus, a
more equitable alternative to the formalistic equality approach would
be to balance the equities based on need.'"
This balancing of the equities would protect the most vulnerable
party in the dispute, who, because of the limited time span of pre-
embryo viability, is undoubtedly the genetic donor who wishes to
implant the pre-embryos. The most vulnerable party may be the per-
son who has suffered psychological, emotional, or physical duress or
impediment and is unable or unwilling to repeat the IVF process. '45
The courts' formalistic use of equality allows the party who does not
want implantation to occur to win simply by objecting. Therefore,
courts only achieve an equality of result based on need by weighing
the needs of both parties. In weighing the equities between the most
vulnerable party and the party opposing implantation, courts should
take into account the possible child support obligations which may
result from a live birth. Understandably, someone who is unwilling to
have offspring may be unwilling to pay for their support. ,4 6 However,
143. In the primary IVF decisionmaking stages, the rights of the parties are balanced
because the willing participation of both donors is required for the IVF procedure.
144. See Fineman, supra note 137.
145. An example of a cause of disability is a man with a low sperm count, or a woman who
has experienced removal of her ovaries. Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at 1082. This party could
be the woman because of the lengthy and painful nature of the procedure for inducing growth
and harvesting ova. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, app. B at 2110 (Cr. Ct.
Sept. 26, 1991) (testimony of Mary Sue Davis), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992); Robertson, supra note 4, at 476
n.95 (asserting that a woman's efforts in the IVF process give her a "sweat equity" interest in
the pre-embryo). Although the woman's considerations apparently lead to a gender-biased
result, it must be emphasized that this Comment focuses on equality of result, not formalistic
equality as has been the goal in other familial disputes. See Fineman, supra note 137. Equality
of result takes into account the different factors the parties bring to any situation. Id. at 792.
This is contrasted with formalistic equality, which declares that something is done to promote
equality although equality may not truly be the result. Id. at 797 n.24.
146. Child support, an attendant responsibility of having children, is enforced by the state
and is supported by strong policy considerations. These policies can be traced to two
underlying concepts: 1) the parent is responsible for maintaining his children; and 2) the
state should not be financially burdened for the maintenance of children who have parents
capable of providing for them. However, courts must balance the state's interest in enforcing
child support against the important state interest in promoting life. See TRIBE, supra note 134,
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the issue may be premature at this point because of the low success
rate of IVF;' 47 despite implantation, no child may ever be born. As a
result, these arguments should be given minimal weight.148
On the other hand, several factors indicate that the courts should
favor the party wishing to implant. Vulnerable litigants usually seek
to implant because they have fewer, if any, procreative alternatives
available. As in Davis, the purpose of IVF is usually to avoid a
woman's damaged fallopian tubes from foreclosing the possibility of
bearing children because she cannot achieve conception through
intercourse. 149 When parties turn to IVF because the woman cannot
conceive in a conventional way, the court should consider her particu-
lar interests in its analysis.
The woman makes a greater investment in creating the pre-
embryo. Preparation for extraction of the female gamete is more
onerous than that required for the extraction of the male gamete. The
woman must undergo hormonal stimulation to encourage production
of multiple ova. The ova must then be surgically aspirated. Only
§ 15-10, at 1345 n.59; Wurmbrand, supra note 4. If the state does not want to place the pre-
embryo in an all-or-nothing situation, it must adopt an alternative method by balancing the
state policies in tension.
The federal government has expressly stated its preference for life regardless of the
availability of child support. The Hyde Amendment, which prohibits federal funding of
abortion for welfare mothers, implicitly reflects this policy; it assumes that if the woman is too
poor to fund an abortion she will also be too poor to support her child without government
help. See H.R.J. Res. 662, 95th Cong., 1st Sess (1977). At least for the federal government, a
chance at life is a more important consideration than child support. Likewise, to resolve the
dispute over the pre-embryo in a manner calculated to allow it the greatest opportunity at life
while not imposing an unwanted child support obligation on one party, the government may
treat the parent objecting to implantation as an anonymous donor of the genetic material,
divested of any further rights, interests, or obligations in it. A program in which pre-embryos
are anonymously donated to surrogates for implantation and/or adoption could achieve this
result.
Should the parties seek a divorce after a child is born from the implantation, they would
be unable to avoid child support obligations. The court could adopt an anonymous donor
analysis and release the non-consenting parent, but the foundation for this position is not
persuasive because the donor will always be known and identifiable.
147. States' policies concerning child support fail to rise to the level of state action. See
Robertson, supra note 3, at 286.
148. Several approaches exist to the child support dispute. The first option is to place upon
the non-consenting party the obligation of support if the parties agreed from the beginning to
undergo the IVF procedure and achieve implantation and birth. In this case, the parties did
not provide for a future disposition of the pre-embryo in the event they no longer wished to
continue with the IVF process. Robertson, supra note 4, at 460. The scholars who advocate
this result rest their arguments on the fact that the party who is now withdrawing consent for
implantation would not have undergone IVF without an expectation that a child would result,
and that child would require support. Id. at 466.
149. However, if a man has fertility problems, and he wishes to implant in a surrogate, he is
the most vulnerable party in that scenario and should be allowed to use the pre-embryo to
implant.
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ejaculation is necessary for harvesting the male gametes. In addition,
one purpose behind cryogenic freezing and storage of the pre-embryos
in this situation is to avoid the woman having to repeatedly undergo
ova harvesting procedures every time implantation is to be
attempted.150 The court should consider this background in its con-
sideration of the equities, and its most effective means of doing so is
under a contract framework.
V. THE CONTRACT FRAMEWORK
This Part explores an alternative theory that utilizes contract
principles to resolve disputes between biological donors in a more
equitable, though not formalistically equal manner. In so doing, the
contract framework focuses on the rights and duties of the biological
donors with respect to each other.' 5 '
The contract framework makes several assumptions. First, it
assumes that courts prefer to address the rights of the parties, rather
than the rights of the pre-embryo, 52 given the uncertainty of the con-
stitutional position on the right to procreate, the uncertainty of the
pre-embryo's status, and the current division in popular opinion
regarding abortion and reproductive technologies. 5 3 The contract
framework assumes that it does not deprive any party of their consti-
tutional rights, and is therefore not invalidated by constitutional pro-
creative rights concerns. 154 Finally, the framework assumes that the
pre-embryo's best fate is to be implanted. 55
The framework does not propose that the pre-embryos are prop-
erty per se. Rather, it focuses on the interests of the genetic donors
with respect to each other, collaterally promoting implantation,
150. See Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at 1084 (cryopreservation avoids necessity of repeated
ova harvesting).
151. Professor Robertson considers whether contractual agreements entered into between
the biological donors and IVF centers should also be binding in disputes between the donors
themselves. Robertson, supra note 4, at 464-70. The goal of Professor Robinson's analysis is
to determine who owns, or has a property interest, in the pre-embryos. Id. at 454. In contrast,
the analysis here focuses on the legal relationship of the biological donors vis-fi-vis each other,
irrespective of their rights or interests in the pre-embryo.
152. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (noting that decision
concerning future children cannot be made by employer and must be left to parents); Davis v.
Davis, 50 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (declining to adopt position that pre-
embryo is life), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992).
153. Certain restrictions on a woman's abortion decisions are unconstitutional. TRIBE,
supra note 114, § 15-10, at 1350.
154. The contract framework would also be unacceptable if it violated the constitutional
protections of procreation.
155. Under the proposed framework, the pre-embryo would thus be implanted in all cases
except those where both parties do not want the pre-embryo implanted.
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which is arguably in the best interest of the pre-embryo. 156 Finally,
under the contract framework, all solutions and outcomes must work
equitable results for the more vulnerable party seeking to implant.
A. The Framework
The main premise of the contract framework assumes that the
biological donors mutually decided to undergo IVF, thereby entering
into a contract, either explicitly or implicity, with each other"5 7 to
create pre-embryos for the purpose of implantation, with the ultimate
goal of achieving live births."'8
1. EXPRESS CONTRACT
Under contract theory, ideally parties would unequivocally
express the intent and scope of their agreement in a written contract
at the time they first attempt IVF. IVF procedures can easily imple-
ment written agreements by including the necessary clauses into
informed consent agreements. Although this agreement is intended to
156. This framework has been implicitly adopted by the district court in York v. Jones, 717
F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), and commentators, see Robertson, supra note 3, at 285.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1979) provides, "An agreement is a
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons." Where, as here, both
parties have mutually consented to undergo the IVF process, they have created an agreement
between themselves. It is possible to find that a contractual relationship exists between the
parties even if they are married at the time the contract is created. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 5.4, at 343 (1st ed. 1982) (noting that spouses may validly contract to alter the
incidents of their relationship, so long as not otherwise contrary to public policy). Moreover,
agreements between spouses to undergo IVF are enforceable, and not void for public policy
reasons. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189-190 (1979). Further, these
contracts do not generally fall under the Statute of Frauds because they have already been
preformed. See id. § 110 (Statute of Frauds generally forbids enforcement of contracts which
are not going to be performed within one year). Of course, the parties are free to alter the
provisions of their agreement as long as the ensuing contract adheres to established laws.
158. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 466; Robertson, supra note 3, at 297-98 (noting that
overriding the agreement of IVF collaborators interferes with their reproductive choice, and
protecting collaborators from later disappointments by not enforcing their agreement is
paternalistic). Although Robertson addresses agreements with surrogates, the same policy
considerations are applicable here, between IVF collaborators. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. a (1979) A promise, between the donors to exchange genetic material
to create a pre-embryo is synonymous with an agreement between parties to create a pre-
embryo for the purpose of implantation.
Professor Robertson argues the advantages of "joint advance instructions" for disposition
of pre-embryos in the face of any eventuality. Robertson, supra note 4, at 463. While
Robertson focuses on the propriety of the couple's decisional authority over the pre-embryos,
id. at 450, the agreements also dictate the course of action between the couple, id. at 464.
Under Professor Robertson's theory, the agreements between the IVF center and the couple
should be binding between the donors themselves for three reasons: (1) the right to reproduce
and avoid reproduction includes the right to give binding advance instructions; (2) all parties
benefit by the ability to rely on future instructions; and (3) it minimizes disputes over
disposition. Id. at 464-65.
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memorialize the agreement between the biological donors and the
IVF center, it can be expanded to cover the contingencies that arise
between the donors themselves.
To establish their intent unequivocally, the parties should
include in their agreement a statement that the initiation of the IVF
procedure is an expression of the parties' decision to exercise their
right to procreate. The agreement should further provide for the dis-
position of the pre-embryo in situations where one or both donors dies
or becomes disabled, the donors divorce, or the donors no longer wish
to continue with the IVF process. Possible provisions might include
permitting a designated party to proceed with implantation, discard-
ing the pre-embryos, or donating them for implantation and parenting
by third parties. In the case of divorce, the parties may want to pro-
vide for a division of the pre-embryos.
The process of negotiating and executing these agreements would
alert the donors of the possibility that their positions may change
between in-vitro fertilization and the time of implantation. These
agreements could then provide the courts with evidence of the parties'
original intentions to facilitate resolving disputes arising after IVF." 9
2. IMPLIED CONTRACT
In the absence of an express contract, courts may find the ele-
ments of an implied contract in the dealings of the parties that led to
the storage of the pre-embryos. Those dealings indicate the terms of
the parties' agreement, which may help the courts resolve later dis-
putes. The court can assume that the parties agreed to carry the IVF
procedure through to implantation,"6 because IVF serves no useful
purpose other than the harvesting of the materials that compose the
pre-embryo to be implanted.' 6 Furthermore, the parties mutually
performed in furtherance of this intent-they both provided gametes
for the IVF procedure.' 62 Their mutual intent at the time of IVF is
159. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
160. Robertson, supra note 4, at 467 ("[T]he parties have created and stored these embryos
on the condition that they will be transferred to a uterus .... ").
161. Davis v. Davis, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, 2099 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) (finding
undergoing IVF exclusively serves purpose of creating children), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 6, 1992). Wurmbrand,
supra note 4, at 1079-80 (IVF popular new procedure to help childless couples have children).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1979) defines the manifestation of
mutual assent as requiring each party to either make a promise or begin or render
performance. In IVF, the parties perform by donating their sperm and ova. The man's
performance had been rendered. He donated his sperm, and no further action is expected of
him. However, in this case, Mary Sue Davis has begun her performance by donating her ova.
Under the parties' agreement, her performance would include carrying the child to term.
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demonstrated by the physical, financial, and emotional investment of
both parties in committing to IVF.'6 a
Thus, through the bilateral exchange of promises to complete the
IVF process by the exchange of gametes for the engineering of a pre-
embryo, the parties create a contract whether or not they have signed
a written agreement.' Moreover, any contract between the parties
would terminate with the end of pre-embryo viability. The contract is
thus for a definite term, defined by the viability span of the pre-
embryos. 165 Once the parties create the pre-embryo, they have per-
formed that part of the contract, and they can only modify the
remainder of the contract by their mutual consent. Thus, under con-
tract principles, the consent of one party to attempt procreation and
the reliance of the other party on the agreement become the determin-
ing factors in allowing either party to implant, even if the other later
seeks to withdraw consent.
66
There are, however, two apparent obstacles to the implementa-
tion of the contract framework. The first involves the ambiguity of
the implied intent. The analysis thus far assumes that the intent
implied from the parties behavior is to implant and attempt to have a
child. Arguably, however, the parties exclusively intended to have
children as a couple. If continuation of their marriage is a material
term, then the question becomes whether divorce frustrates the con-
tract as to that term, or impairs the entire contract.
In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the possibility
that Mary Sue and Junior Davis entered into an implied contract to
"The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to
engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from
his conduct that he assents." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1979).
Clearly, under this definition, the performance of both parties in giving the genetic material is a
manifestation of their assent to the IVF agreement.
163. Bonnicksen, supra note 2, at 26, 27. Both parties have already acted in reliance on
their implied IVF agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 34(3) (1979)
("Action in reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate.").
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1979) ("An agreement is a
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons); see also supra note 158.
165. See Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097, app. B at 2107 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574
(Tenn. June 6, 1992).
166. We cannot know whether the decision to proceed with IVF extinguishes the
procreative rights of the non-consenting party because we do not (according to the definition of
procreation) know if a party has procreated until a child is born. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1086 (6th ed. 1990) (defining procreation as "[t]he generation of children"); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 148 (1979) (proposing that, while
unperformed, duties under a contract may be discharged by oral agreement). However, here
the party still seeking to implant is demonstrating, at least implicitly, that there has been no
such discharge.
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reproduce using IVF, due to such ambiguous intent.'67 The court
noted that there was no record evidence that the parties considered
the pre-embryos' disposition in case of eventualities other than preg-
nancy, and that there was no record evidence that Junior Davis
"intended to pursue reproduction outside the confines of a continuing
marital relationship with Mary Sue."'' 68 However, the court's reason-
ing was flawed. The fundamental premise of the parties' agreement in
undergoing IVF was to create pre-embryos. The sole purpose of cre-
ating pre-embryos was to facilitate their growth and development into
children. If there was no evidence that the parties discussed other
possibilities, then the agreement did not encompass such possibilities,
but the court should not have fashioned terms to address them. Even
if Junior Davis did not intend to continue with IVF after divorce,
Mary Sue Davis did not share his intention. 169 Under contract princi-
ples, Junior Davis' unexpressed intention was his own misunderstand-
ing. 1 70 If Junior knew of Mary Sue's desire, and was aware that his
own desires would conflict with hers in the face of a divorce, then the
court should have used Mary Sue's meaning in defining the terms of
their agreement. 7' If Junior had no reason to know Mary Sue would
desist in the face of divorce, while knowing he would oppose implan-
tation in the face of divorce, then the court should not have fashioned
terms to protect his feelings while frustrating Mary Sue's intentions.
The second obstacle to the contract framework involves constitu-
tional concerns. Under Roe, a woman may not be forced to implant
and carry a fetus to term.I72 This would be true even if she had previ-
ously agreed to have a baby. However, in equity, this does not mean
that the object of the contract, implantation, must be frustrated. A
woman who changes her mind about implanting should not be per-
167. Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574, at *10 (Tenn. June 6, 1992).
168. Id.
169. Mary Sue indicated that she was not sure what her reaction would be in the face of
divorce, but she was committed to the idea of being a mother and would have gone ahead with
IVF. Id. at "17 n.10.
170. The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the meaning
attached to them by one of the parties if
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party has no reason to know the meaning attached by the other, and
the other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2) (1979).
171. See id. cmt. d (noting that a party should be bound to an agreement "by a merely
negligent manifestation of assent, if the other party was not negligent").
172. Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman may legally abort a fetus. A
woman's right to terminate pregnancy implies the right to prevent pregnancy by refusing
implantation of a pre-embryo. See Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574, at '17 n.21
(Tenn. June 6, 1992).
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mitted to prevent the male donor from fulfilling the contract by
implanting with another woman for his benefit.'73 The contract
would have been frustrated only as to implantation by the original
party. The opportunity to implant would not be entirely frustrated,
however.
B. Practical Applications of the Framework
There are several different factual scenarios in which the contract
framework can apply: (1) one party wants to implant and the other
does not; (2) both parties want to implant; (3) both parties want to
implant, but the woman does not want the pre-embryo implanted in
herself, and the parties cannot agree on a surrogate; (4) neither party
desires implantation, but one or both do not want the pre-embryo
donated for adoption or implantation; and (5) neither party wants
implantation, and neither has any further use for the pre-embryo.
The contract framework, applied to each case, allows the court to
tailor the result to the given situations, and allows the party who
wants to implant to do so.'74
In the first scenario, one party wants to implant the pre-embryo,
and the other party opposes.' 75 This is the Davis scenario. 176 Under
the contract framework, the prior implied consent of the party now
opposing implantation, coupled with the right to procreate of the
party seeking to implant the pre-embryo, outweighs the dissenter's
right not to procreate. Unlike Davis, the court would not have to
resort to the constitutionally infirm solution of determining when life
begins in order to reach its result. By applying the contract frame-
work, the court in Davis would have ordered compliance with the
terms of the contract in order to protect Mary Sue's reliance interest.
Mary Sue would have been allowed to implant the pre-embryo.
Mary Sue's later decision not to implant would not frustrate the
contract. On appeal, Mary Sue wanted to allow a third person to
implant the pre-embryos. Junior opposed this course of action.
Because each party would be proposing a term in conflict with the
173. Robertson, supra note 4, at 466.
174. See generally Robertson, supra note 4. Robertson argues that these agreements should
be enforced against the party who has changed his/her mind. This implicitly assumes that the
most vulnerable party will want to implant. If the most vulnerable party does not want to
implant the pre-embryos, the other party should be permitted to implant them if so desired.
175. This scenario can arise whether the man or the woman is opposed to implantation.
Although the Davis scenario is used for the purpose of discussion, the analysis applies equally
in situations where the man seeks to implant and the woman does not want implantation to
occur.
176. See Robertson, supra note 4.
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original contract provisions, it would be an ineffective attempt to
modify the original contract, and the contract would stand.
17 7
Under contract principles, courts resist modifing the terms of the
parties' agreement. 178 Under such an analysis, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals in Davis would not have ordered joint control. The court
instead would have stated that both parties still have interests in the
pre-embryo in compliance with the terms of the agreement, and the
pre-embryo will not be implanted at this time. However, the duration
of the contract-the time of pre-embryo viability-is not over. There-
fore, either party may perform in compliance with the contract until
that time. This point reveals the true advantage of the contract
framework in contrast with the joint control solution. The parties, in
a joint-control framework, are frozen in their positions. The parties
cannot implant unless they both agree. Each party can block the
other's attempt to get out of the conundrums "until the fertility clinic
decides they no longer want to keep them and tells the Davises to
come and pick up the damn things."' 79 The only possible outcome,
barring agreement between the two parties who are now divorced and
separately remarried, is that the litigation will stop when the pre-
embryos are no longer viable. As a result of the court's grant of veto
power to each party, the struggle for control of the pre-embryo may
develop into a contest of one-upsmanship between the parties, with
resources going to pay legal fees rather than rebuilding the parties'
lives after the divorce. By contrast, the contract framework would
allow Junior Davis the opportunity to implant with a surrogate if he
desires. Absent the appellate court's order, the parties' attempt at
modification of the contract would be ineffective. The original con-
tract would bind Junior Davis.
The next scenario is one where, although the couple may be sepa-
rated, they still desire to give the pre-embryo a chance to be
implanted. They may wish to see the pre-embryo implanted in a sur-
rogate, or an adoptive mother. However, the fact that each parent
has alternate preferences is irrelevant as long as they are in agree-
ment. In this case, in accordance with the contract, implantation,
absent physiological reasons to the contrary, should be attempted in
the natural mother. Usually, she will be the most vulnerable party,
unable to conceive by other means. The man may be able to have
children without recourse to these pre-embryos. This result should be
177. Id. at 466.
178. See 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 610A at 513 (2d ed. 1957) ("[l]t is not the
function of the judiciary to change the obligations of a contract which the parties have seen fit
to make.").
179. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 466.
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amenable to both parties because both desire implantation to achieve
a live birth.
If the parties want to implant but the woman does not want the
pre-embryo implanted in herself, and the parties cannot agree upon a
surrogate, then following the contract framework, the pre-embryo
will not be implanted. The identity of a surrogate need not be a mate-
rial term, as long as the parties do not insist on a surrogate who may
be completely unacceptable to the other party, such as a new wife.
However, this is an instance where the court may need to look at
additional facts to achieve an equitable result. The central fact then
becomes why the woman does not want the pre-embryo implanted in
herself. Indeed, this fact supplies the context for the ensuing decision-
making process. If the reason is a medical inability to carry to term,
then the court examines whether the man is trying to obstruct per-
formance by unreasonably refusing to agree on a surrogate. The par-
ties to the contract should be expected to act in good faith and deal
fairly. If this is not the case, then the man is in breach and the pre-
embryo should be implanted in the woman's chosen surrogate. Addi-
tionally, since both parents want to procreate, the procreative rights
are not implicated in this decision.
The final scenario occurs when neither party has any further
desire to implant the pre-embryo, and neither party has a preference
about its disposition. The parties' voluntary determination rescinds
the contract and further negates any involvement of their reproduc-
tive rights. Accordingly, the parties implicitly consent to any action
taken with the pre-embryos. The IVF center may then adopt provi-
sions, subject, of course, to state regulation,18 0 which would allow
abandoned pre-embryos to be adopted,""1 or alternatively allow the
use of the pre-embryos for medical research. This IVF center
arrangement is not at odds with the state's interest in promoting life.
Moreover, in a Davis situation, where there is no agreement with the
IVF center, the state is free to effectuate its preference for life by man-
dating adoption of the pre-embryo. Both gamete providers would be
treated as anonymous donors, avoiding any rearing or support
responsibility. 82
However, it is possible that one or both parties will not want the
pre-embryo donated for implantation or experimentation. If both
180. See Robertson, supra note 3 (commenting on necessity of IVF centers to adopt
procedures for donation of undesired frozen pre-embryos).
181. Most centers provide for adoption in cases where neither party wants the pre-embryo.
See Bonnicksen, supra note 2; see also supra note 102.
182. See John A. Robertson, Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
939, 980 (1986); Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at 1095.
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parties oppose procreation, there is a strong presumption that the par-
ties' rights not to procreate should be protected.183 For the state to
force implantation would be repugnant to present Supreme Court
decisions that limit state interference in procreative rights.184
VI. CONCLUSION
The contract framework does not purport to resolve the myriad
complex issues surrounding human reproduction. Instead, this
framework attempts to resolve disputes between donors by reference
to the parties' relationship, rather than by reference to unresolved
legal issues with far-reaching moral, social, and political implications.
The parties in these cases have already undergone enormous stress
and expense. Prolonged, complex litigation benefits no one.
The contract framework presented here seeks to maximize bene-
fits for all the parties involved. It provides the courts a reference for
weighing the equities of the litigants, and provides the litigants the
security that their concerns are being addressed and weighed by the
court. This framework is a flexible solution that allows the facts of
each case to be weighed independently on its merits. Our jurispruden-
tial tradition prefers focusing upon the parties' voluntary actions
rather than imposing a normative solution based upon values to
which neither of the affected parties necessarily adheres. In the end,
this flexibility should permit equitable results in most cases.
The contract framework seeks to maximize the benefits of the
parties' agreements, while simultaneously avoiding any unnecessary
change in the different areas of consitutional law surrounding this
issue. By promoting flexibility of results, as well as opportunities for
implantation of pre-embryos, the framework provides a fair and effi-
cient way to resolve the issues between the parties who are most inti-
mately affected.
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183. On the contrary, the Supreme Court is upholding contraceptive rights based on the
individual's privacy rights, which include the right to prevent procreation with contraceptives.
184. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; see also Wurmbrand, supra note 4, at
1095.
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